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The growth of large metropolitan areas and public reliance on the
private automobile have combined to produce what has been called a
transportation "problem"-congestion due to inadequate facilities for
the movement of people. In recent years, the federal and many state
governments have evidenced a growing interest in funding major
transportation programs. This development, in addition to recent
fuel shortages, suggests that public transit will be an important policy
concern for at least the remainder of this decade.
The policy choice, then, is not whether to invest in mass transpor-
tation, for this is almost a foregone conclusion. Rather, the choice is
what type of transit system seems warranted and represents a sensible
investment in a specific metropolitan area. Public discussions usually
focus on variations of two basic technologies: buses and trains. Largely
because of the discouraging performance of metropolitan bus opera-
tions since Wrorld War II, there is a resurgent interest in high-speed,
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Connecticut. B.A., Poli-
tical Science-Economics, Whittier College, 1962; M.B.A., Business Administration,
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fixed rail systems such as are now being implemented in Atlanta, San
Francisco and Washington, D.C.'
Yet it is not dear whether the relative "failure" of bus systems can
be attributed to features inherent in a bus technology or to the fact
that, given a choice, most people will prefer to use private rather than
public means of transportation. Assuming that gasoline supplies are
available, can any package of positive inducements be arranged for
public transit-whether buses or trains-that will be sufficient to lure
people from the automobile? I submit that this is an open ques-
tion and deserves far more serious attention than it has received.2
Let us assume, then, that the choice of metropolitan mass transpor-
tation investments is between buses and trains. Two factors should be
considered in order to highlight more dearly the optimal choices
available. First, we must understand the social context of decision-
making; that is, what are the attributes of metropolitan areas, and
what are the implications of those attributes for policy-making? Sec-
ondly, we must understand the role of technology in policy choice in
order to determine whether investment in buses or trains really makes
a difference. These variables-social complexity and technological
choice-will be discussed in the context of the decision to build a
rail rapid transit system in the San Francisco Bay Area.
I. SOCIAL COMPLEXITY
The social complexity of major metropolitan areas is not difficult to
comprehend in the abstract. First, the number of actors and units to
be accounted for is large and heterogeneous. Secondly, if we consider,
as a single example, the numbers and types of governmental units,
there is considerable differentiation and specialization in metropolitan
areas. Finally, the degree of interdependence among these many actors
1. Leaders in approximately two dozen major metropolitan areas want to build
or expand subway systems during the next decade. A reluctant national adminis-
tration, through capital construction grants and operating subsidies, appears des-
tined to assist in this effort. A powerful political lobbying effort composed of big-
city mayors and suburban legislators is backing the push for transit funding. The
former believe that subways will both improve mobility and reinvigorate central
business districts; the latter view subways in terms of better commuting facilities,
less highway construction, and a cleaner environment. See Lilley, Mayors and
White House Prepare for Battle over $40-Billion Subway Program, 4 NAT'L 3.
484 (1972).
2. For a summary of the results of two recent studies on this question see 76
TECHNOLOGY LaV., Oct.-Nov. 1973, at 66.
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and units is substantial as is manifested, for instance, by the sectoral
dislocations resulting from the recent fuel shortage.
What, if any, are the implications of this social complexity for the
manner in which public policy issues are addressed? The complexities
of social systems and our ability to understand those complexities
are inversely related: the more of one, the less of the other. Public
policy-making in complex social systems, then, is fraught with uncer-
tainty, particularly in the matter of making choices. Under conditions
of social complexity, the probability of making poor choices, and thus
mistakes, increases sharply. Further, such mistakes may have serious
consequences in terms of the social and political experiences of the
affected publics.
As social complexity increases, with its resultant uncertainties, we
become less able to predict future developments with accuracy. The
less the certainty about the future, the greater the risks involved in
decision-making. The prevalence of planning activities during the
past decade can be understood as one method of attempting to cope
with increased complexity and of trying to reduce the magnitude and
seriousness of decision errors.
But is it possible to plan effectively for an uncertain future? If
planning means understanding the relevant variables and relation-
ships as well as the ability to control their effects, social complexity
would seem to preclude the requisite knowledge and understanding.
This situation presents a paradox. Since we may be unclear about the
relationship between an action and its consequences, it would seem
sensible to plan before acting. But if what we have said about social
complexity is true, planning is also uncertain and hazardous. The
dilemma arises from the need to act without complete information;
and the fact that actions may have serious unanticipated and/or un-
intended consequences is a chilling reality for decision-makers. 3
One way decision-makers have eased this burden of doubt is to look
to "authorities." Under conditions of social complexity, experts-i.e.,
individuals possessing "knowledge" and "information"-assume an in-
creased importance in decision situations because they are considered
3. The significance of this argument should not be underestimated, for it flies
in the face of the conventional wisdom that complexity necessitates planning.
See generally ORGANIZED SOCIAL COMPLEIxTY: CHALLENGE TO POLITICS AND
POLICY (T. LaPorte ed. 1974). The relationship between complexity and plan-
ning is specifically addressed in the chapters by D. Meflay & J. Ruggie.
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capable of understanding highly technical problems. We have come
to believe that technical questions should be answered by technical
experts, whom we tend to regard as "neutral" and "objective," and
who are thought to render judgments (not opinions) on the basis
of facts (not feelings).
Thus, social complexity and the rise of experts have produced a
change in the character of the political arena. In folklore, if not in
fact, a democracy's political process begins with citizens coming to-
gether to exercise their power to make choices about public issues.
At one time, all voters actually could be assembled to discuss and
make decisions about their lives in common, but today's metropolitan
areas are inhabited by millions of persons. Even if it were still pos-
sible to convene citizens, it is doubtful whether they could render in-
formed decisions in this highly complex and technological society.
Instead of coming together to debate and make choices about public
issues, contemporary Americans play a lesser role: either ratifying or
rejecting proposals advanced in the name of "the public interest"
and often formulated by technical experts chosen by political officials.
Political choices, however, are still, as always, far too important to be
left to the experts, upon whose recommendations the electorate can
only register either approval or disapproval. We do need expert ad-
vice, but we should use it only where appropriate (i.e., in situations
requiring a substantial assembly of facts and objective data). Most
essential decisions, however, are based more on subjective attitudes and
preferences ("values") than on facts per se. And where personal be-
liefs are concerned, the expert's opinion is no more valid than the lay-
man's. In short, experts should help to provide background for policy
choices, not formulate them.
Thus far, the social complexity of a metropolitan area as well as its
practical and ethical implications for decision-makers has been noted.
This has led to a growing concern for planning (which may be less
possible than has been imagined) and a reliance on authoritative
experts to assist in the pursuit of more effective planning. One con-
sequence for the political arena may be that the citizen will be "dis-
placed," as it were, in the decision process. With this background, it
is now possible to consider the role of technology in the policy-making
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II. TECHNOLOGY AS A STRATEGIC ELEMENT IN POLICY CHOICE
Technology, like expertise, is generally regarded as a neutral, apo-
litical instrument. Choosing among alternative technologies is thought
to result from a thorough and objective analysis. In considering the
choice between buses and trains, for example, we tend to focus on the
respective technologies as if, in themselves, they represent better or
worse solutions to the metropolitan transportation problem. This
focus on technological solutions, however, often obscures other im-
portant considerations.
The essential function of a transportation system is to link points
distributed in geographic space, thereby providing a means for con-
veying people from one place to another. As such, there is little
intrinsic value in a transportation facility; rather, it is a means to an
end, an instrument by which other, nontransportation purposes may
be served.4 This suggests that the choice from among a set of alterna-
tive technologies, all of which are roughly equal in their capacity to
deliver a transportation service, is deliberate rather than accidental.
The choice of technology, then, is purposive and is determined in
large part by executive perceptions of the problem to be solved and
how best to remedy it. Confusion arises because arguments for or
against particular transportation facilities are presented as if better
transportation were the principal or primary objective. Yet, as we
noted above, transportation is not an end in itself. Buses and trains
may be presented as alternative solutions to a problem, but the prob-
lem they address may have little to do with transportation. Because
of the interrelationships between transportation and land use, the
issue-and the preference for one or the other technology-often has
to do with the future pattern of metropolitan development.
Proposals for transportation systems can thus be understood as re-
sponses to, or methods of coping with, an uncertain future. Two basic
strategies are involved, and the adoption of either strategy depends
upon whether decision-makers prefer to keep future options open or
closed.
The first strategy, an incremental one, is embodied in a tech-
4. M. Webber & S. Angel, The Social Context for Transport Policy (re-
printed from a compilation of papers prepared for the Panel on Science and
Technology, Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representa-
tivcs, 1969). (Also available as Reprint No. 48, Institute of Urban and Regional
Development, University of California, Berkeley.)
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nology that is capable of adapting or adjusting to a changing future.
The decision-maker who adopts this strategy seeks, above all, to hedge
his bets. Lacking a commitment to a specific vision of the future, he
attempts to maximize the chance of being able to respond to what-
ever possibilities the future may hold. Tactically, the decision-maker
endeavors to avoid irreversible choices in order to minimize the risks
of being wrong. The more a new technology lends itself to in-
cremental change, the better. The more costly a decision error is
perceived to be, the greater the preference for an adaptive technology.
The second strategy is comprehensive or synoptic and finds expres-
sion in a prescriptive technology. The decision-maker who adopts this
strategy seeks to minimize the vagaries of an uncertain future by plac-
ing all the eggs in one technological basket, as it were. In this instance
the decision-maker has a specific vision of the future and seeks, through
technological choice, to realize it. As contrasted with the adaptive,
adjustive technology, which can respond to a changing future, the
prescriptive technology so dominates and overwhelms the future that
other possibilities are almost precluded. Given a preference for an
ordered future, a decision-maker will opt for an inflexible technology,
one that shapes developments rather than responds to them. Whereas
the incremental strategy dictates flexibility precisely because the costs
of error are high, the comprehensive strategy dictates rigidity in order
to make error irrelevant if it should arise.
The fundamental trade-off is the extent to which the technology can
be modified. The incremental strategy-adaptive technology serves the
present and is capable of responding to future requirements as long
as the future does not differ drastically from the present. Because a
flexible technology can, in principle, be adjusted to meet changing
circumstances, the technology serves as a built-in mechanism for re-
ducing social and political conflict, particularly in the present and
probably in the future.
The comprehensive strategy-prescriptive technology, on the other
hand, requires an investment of present resources so that the future
pattern of metropolitan development may be shaped and, hopefully,
served. The technology may thus serve as an instrument for prevent-
ing unwanted patterns of development, or at least for constraining
them. Because an inflexible technology cannot respond to altered cir-
cumstances (i.e., a future different from that envisioned by those who
planned it), this technology has a potential for generating conflict not
only in the present, but in the future as well.
[Vol. 8:97
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Hence, the choice between alternative technologies depends upon
how decision-makers regard an uncertain future. Technology, of
course, is not determinative; it alone does not cause things to happen
or not to happen. The immediate consequence of choosing between
technologies, however, is to encourage some possibilities while dis.
couraging others. A flexible technology (buses) can be adjusted to
fit a range of possible futures; an inflexible technology (trains) can-
not be so adjusted. In sum, the selection of a prescriptive technology
is a fundamental gamble that the future will accommodate the tech-
nology rather than that the technology will accommodate the future.
11. THE SAN FRANcIsco BAY AREA RAPID TRANsrr (BART) SYsTEm
In view of the current national attention being accorded mass transit
systems, it seems particularly appropriate to elaborate on the impact of
technology on the decision process. Having provided a theoretical
framework for analysis, let us turn our attention to the decision to
build a fixed-rail rapid transit system in the San Francisco Bay Area.
The 792 million dollar BART bond election of November 1962 is the
largest local bond issue ever approved in the United States. It
amounted to thirteen times the total transit indebtedness in the
state at that time, or a sum twice as large as the total of all other
general obligation bond debts in the three counties comprising
the rapid transit district. Although BART was, at the time of the
1962 decision, a strictly local project, the federal government will now
pay 80% of the capital construction costs of future mass transit proj-
ects.- Furthermore, now that BART is "on stage," we have much to
learn that can be applied to other proposals still "in the wings,"
especially with respect to fashioning our future.
A. Early Planning Efforts
Various proposals for rapid transit planning in the Bay Area have
been aired since the turn of the century. Most of the planning activity
prior to World War II focused primarily on subway systems for San
Francisco's downtown business district. The voters of San Francisco
evidently did not share the enthusiasm of the City's civic leaders for
they voted down a subway proposal in November 1939.
During World War II, San Francisco Congressman Richard J. Welch
voiced his concern about the strategic importance of traffic movement
5. Act of August 13, 1973, § 301(a), 87 Stat. 296.
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to national security. This prompted the federal government to create
an Army-Navy Board in 1946 to study the need for additional Bay
crossings. Although the Board did not agree with Welch on the im-
mediate need for new facilities, it did recommend a completely inte-
grated rapid transit system with a subaqueous tube between San Fran-
cisco and Oakland. While the implications of that study were not
immediately obvious, the context of the discussion on Bay Area rapid
transit had undergone a shift of major importance: a local concern
voiced by local elites had become a regional concern supported by
national authorities.
B. The Goal: To Preserve San Francisco's Preeminence
San Francisco's civic leaders were convinced that if nothing were
done to prevent it, their city would decay for many of the same rea-
sons that other major American cities were decaying. Expanding net-
works of high-speed public roadways enabled people to move out of
central cities into suburban areas. Furthermore, as low-density suburbs
emerged, retail business and light industry began to leave the urban
core to take advantage of new markets and lower costs. Unless these
apparent shifts were arrested, prominent San Franciscans foresaw a
decline in the City's status as the cultural and economic "capitol" of
the West.
These civic leaders were convinced that the basic problem was the
inadequate transportation facilities. During peak commuting hours,
for example, traffic congestion was steadily increasing at the six prin-
cipal gateways to San Francisco. If the problem of traffic congestion
could be solved, one of San Francisco's major problems-the shift of
consumer buying patterns away from the central city and toward the
suburbs-would be solved as well.
Given the objective of preserving the status of San Francisco within
the region and the understanding that one way to do this was by im-
proving access to the city, the topographic constraints made the answer
seem obvious: a system of rail transit. Since the points of entry
were subject to periodic blockage, the accepted solution was a high-
speed, high-capacity transportation system that could operate on its
own exclusive right-of-way. But the impetus for rapid transit did not
seem to arise primarily from a concern for better transportation to
serve the region, but rather from a desire to rejuvenate the downtown
retail business and financial districts of San Francisco.
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C. 1951: A Study Commission Is Formed
In 1949 the California Legislature authorized the various local
governments in the San Francisco Bay Area to form a rapid transit
district6 Although many civic leaders were convinced that rapid
transit was necessary, the large number of local jurisdictions that were
to be considered, as well as the lack of public consensus on the need
for rapid transit, made the immediate formation of a rapid transit
district impractical.
When it became apparent that such a district would not be created
without further study, the legislation was amended, and the San
Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission was established.7 The
26-member Commission was charged with the investigation and study
of rapid transit problems in the nine Bay Area counties and with the
development of a coordinated rapid transit master plan.
The Commission retained the firm of Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Hall
and Macdonald (PBHM) in November 1953. PBHM was a New York
firm of engineering consultants whose founder was chiefly responsible
for the development and construction of New York City's subway
system. A broad range of studies, conducted under the aegis of the
prime contractor, culminated in a coordinated rapid transit plan that
was submitted to the Commission and then to the legislature in early
1956. That report, Regional Rapid Transit, is the basic source docu-
ment for rapid transit planning in the Bay Area and merits close scru-
tiny. What questions were asked? How were the answers formulated?
D. The Issue Posed: Automobile Congestion vs.
Regional Rapid Transit
The Commission posed four basic questions for the consultants:
(1) is an interurban rapid transit system needed for the Bay Area?
(2) if so, what areas should rapid transit serve and along what routes
,hould it be constructed? (3) what type of rapid transit facility would
best meet the Bay Area's needs? and (4) is the cost justified?
The problem was defined by the consultants as automobile conges-
tion. Stating the need for both local and interurban express transpor-
6. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Act, ch. 1239, § 4, [1949] Cal. Stats.
2173 (repealed 1957).
7. Ch. 1760 [1951] Cal. Stats. 4187.
8. PARSONS, BRINCKERHOFF, HALL & MACDONALD, REGIONAL RAPID TRANSIT:
A REPORT TO THE SAN FRANcisco BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT COIIISSION, 1953-
55 (1956).
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tation, the consultants noted that although the Bay Area depended
upon mass transit, transit patronage was declining. The basic alter-
natives facing Bay Area citizens were starkly stated as
whether to accept the stagnation and decline of interurban
transit and to prepare for drastic decentralization and repattern-
ing of its urban centers to meet the avalanche of automobiles
that will result-or whether to reinvigorate interurban transit
so as to sustain the daily flow of workers, shoppers, and visitors
on which the vitality of these urban centers depends.0
The conclusion reached by the consultants was that transit must be
reinvigorated:
We on our part are convinced that the prosperity of the entire
Bay Area will depend upon the preservation and enhancement
of its urban centers and subcenters. Sustaining these as concen-
trations of employment, commerce, and culture will depend on
the reinvigoration of interurban transit.10
The consultants then proceeded to develop a comprehensive plan
for regional rapid transit, a plan "fundamentally directed at curing
traffic congestion." 1 After describing briefly some of the highlights
of the comprehensive plan, the consultants observed:
The ultimate decision on whether or not to provide rapid
transit will be a matter of policy; it should rest upon the basic
decision of the Bay Area citizens as to the type of region they
wish it to be.
•.. The Bay Area is still young enough for its over-all urban de-
velopment to be purposefully molded into a desired pattern,
according to the long-range needs and aspirations of its people.
The decisions made daily by individuals, business firms, and
legislative bodies will largely determine what form the urban
expansion will take; and among the most critical of these deci-
sions are those concerned with transportation services ...
•.. It is imperative, therefore, that the design of the rapid transit
portion of the transportation system be based upon a recognition
of its effects on future urbanization. The plan for future Tegional
development forms the foundation for the design of the rapid
transit system.'2
9. Id. at 1.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2, 18 (emphasis added).
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E. The Preferred Pattern: Centralization and Nucleation
The consultants then addressed alternative patterns of future urban
organization, which, tersely stated, were centralization or decentraliza-
tion of commercial activities:
An effort can be made to encourage the development of large,
nucleated, high-intensity business districts in appropriate loca-
tions. Or an alternative effort can be made to encourage the
dispersion of new business establishments in much smaller dis-
tricts or in scattered, isolated locations entirely outside business
districts. To a great degree, this choice is a matter of public
policy . .. The development of nucleated centers and sub-
centers is possible only if these are served by a high-capacity
transportation system integrating freeways and rapid transit. To
depend on highways alone is inevitably to choose the alternative
of dispersion.13
Because the consultants believed the alternative of nucleated centers
(high-density, high-intensity) to be the dearly preferable choice, they
did not address other alternatives.
The consultants recognized that transit planning should follow
rather than precede choices on alternative regional futures. Never-
theless, they did not fully discuss various possible conceptions of
regional development. In fact, they assumed the desired pattern of
future development was a "given":
The general concept of the region's future organization is that [of]
a system of centers of varying levels of activity, market size, and
specialization. . .. By providing high speed transit service be-
tween residential communities and the concentrated business
centers, the maximum degree of choice of living place and work-
ing place is opened to the population. Only in this way can the
desires of the people to live in low-density, suburban residences
be economically accommodated.14
Finally, although the total cost of implementing the comprehensive
regional rapid transit plan was to be high (1.545 billion dollars), the
consultants endorsed it without qualification:
The essence of the story is that without rapid transit the region
will ultimately pay many times its cost in additional hours of
travel time, in the additional cost of trucking goods over high-
ways congested by automobiles, in diminished revenues from
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 20.
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property depreciated by congestion or swallowed by automobile
facilities, and in the premium costs of urban freeways and park-
ing garages. We do not doubt that the Bay Area Citizens can
afford rapid transit; we question seriously whether they can
afford NOT to have it.'r
F. 1957: BART-To Build an Interurban Railroad
The task of the Commission ended with the submission of its re-
port to the legislature. In early 1957, Senator John F. McCarthy of
Main County, whose previous efforts on behalf of rapid transit led to
the creation of the Commission, sponsored a Commission-drafted bill
to create a rapid transit district. In June 1957, the legislature created
BART.
Regional Rapid Transit (1956) provided the groundwork for the
Composite Report (1962), the second major document guiding the
development of rail rapid transit in the Bay Area. 0 Both were pre-
pared by PBHM, and, not surprisingly, both were based upon the
same assumptions. Thus, the 1962 planning report, like the 1956 feasi-
bility study, defined the problem as existing and future automobile
congestion:
The continuing increase of highway traffic congestion threatens
the future growth and well-being of the San Francisco Bay Area.
The central cities of San Francisco and Oakland particularly are
vulnerable.
.'The crux of the Bay Area's congestion problem is the growing
use of automobiles and the declining use of public transit, es-
pecially during the peak travel hours.17
Despite the emphasis on congestion in central cities, however,
BART was not intended to be an urban transit but rather a regional
and interurban railroad. As its routes and the distance between sta-
tions indicate, "[t]he regional rapid transit system transports people
between outlying suburban areas and the central core areas."' 8 In
other words, BART was primarily intended for people who had a
choice between the private automobile and public transit.
15. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).
16. PARSONS, BRINCKERHOFr, TuDOR, BECHTEL et al., THE COMPOSITE RE-
PORT: BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT, MAY 1962.
17. Id. at 76.
18. Id. at 16.
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Although rapid transit was justified in terms of its ability to relieve
traffic congestion, the specific benefits of BART-listed in the order
they appear in the Composite Report-were only secondarily concerned
with transportation. Those benefits were: (1) to preserve and en-
hance urban centers and subcenters; (2) to increase property values;
(3) to help prevent urban sprawl; (4) to improve employment con-
ditions by attracting industry; (5) to improve access to social, cult
tural and recreational opportunities; (6) to increase the efficiency of
transportation expenditures by reducing the requirements for addi-
tional automobile-related facilities; and (7) to provide low-cost trans-
portation.19 This list of benefits suggests that BART was to be a tool
for shaping the future growth of the region instead of a way of re-
lieving urban traffic congestion.
IV. THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE
The foregoing distillation of some major ideas in the feasibility and
planning studies upon which BART is based raises some disturbing
questions about the politics of professionals. It appears that all the
principals agreed upon the desirability of rail rapid transit before the
first study of the Bay Area's transportation requirements was under-
taken. It seemed only natural, then, to retain the services of a con-
sulting firm with an established reputation in that field. This having
been done, it is not surprising that a rail system was, in fact, recom-
mended.
Our traditional understanding of professional judgments is that they
are based on an impartial assessment of alternative possibilities. In
the planning and feasibility studies for BART, however, no other
transportation modality was evaluated. Accordingly, it appears that
the role of the experts was to design, merchandise and implement a
particular type of transit system rather than to discover what future
pattern of regional development was desired by the citizens of the
Bay Area and then to design the transit facility best suited to meet
those expressed desires. According to our conventional definition of
professionalism, this type of behavior is surprising. Moreover, the
question of the constituencies or clients to whom professionals re-
spond is in doubt.
The consultants were fully aware that the recommendation of a
19. Id. at 82-83.
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transportation system was not the primary question. Indeed, they
explicitly recognized that the selection of a transportation system was
a technical consideration dependent upon a prior political choice,
made by the public, as to the preferred patterns of regional develop-
ment. Yet, by rendering a technical judgment about what they under-
stood to be the most desirable pattern of development, the experts
acted politically to predetermine what was in "the public interest."
Furthermore, as transportation experts they made a judgment about
land use objectives, a field in which they had little or no claim to
expertise. Thus, BART's managers and their consultants arrogated to
themselves what was properly a public and political decision. By
presenting only one view of one technology they effectively limited
the choice to rail rapid transit or nothing, instead of providing an
informational background of alternative possibilities to serve as the
basis for public choice.
Unquestionably, BART was presented to the public as a remedy
for transportation ills, and it seems reasonable to assume that citizens
understood BART in terms of its alleged transportation benefits (e.g.,
congestion relief). The documentary record, however, suggests that
the transportation benefits were of secondary importance. The plan-
ners and promoters of BART understood their mission mainly in
terms of land use and economic benefits; that is, the revitalization of
downtown business districts.20
V. THE PoLiTIcs OF TECHNOLOGY
The fact that BART planners did not seriously explore either al-
ternative technologies or different patterns of future regional develop-
ment prior to their recommendation of rail transit implies a definite
political strategy.21 Bus systems, for example, operate on public road-
ways that usually precede the formation of a transit district and that
20. By calling attention to the "hidden agenda" of the Bay Area's rapid tran-
sit enthusiasts, it is not meant to suggest that this phenomenon is unique to BART.
Indeed, America's transportation history is replete with such examples. California's
freeway system, for instance, was also sold on a partial basis. The U.S. Interstate
Highway System was publicly advocated for defense purposes while actually being
intended to stabilize the postwar economy, to give jobs to contractors, and to help
truckers profit from long freight hauls. Thus, BART followed a well-established
tradition.
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are amenable to a variety of uses. Moreover, bus service can be in-
augurated, expanded, contracted or shifted in a short time and at a
relatively low cost. Although a bus system may be highly integrated,
its component parts are not highly interdependent, i.e., the ability of
one bus to operate is not fundamentally contingent upon the opera-
tion of other buses.22 A bus system, because of its flexible technology,
is able to react without a great deal of prior planning activity. Its
capacity for incremental adjustment permits immediate action and the
feedback from such action to substitute for long-range planning.
Assuming that the bus company takes feedback seriously and attempts
to adjust services accordingly, it is able to use action as a substitute
form of planning.
BART, on the other hand, has had to acquire property prior to
constructing an essentially single-purpose facility and then to engage
in a long-term construction phase. This means that the "start-up"
time is much longer in the case of a train system; for instance, the
period from the capitalization of BART to its actual operation as a
passenger-carrying facility was ten years. Not only is the time-lag be-
tween decision and operation considerable, but any subsequent al-
teration of the basic physical system is very expensive. Furthermore,
since BART is both highly integrated and interdependent, a mal-
function in one part of the system may affect the operation of the
entire system. This makes redundancy a desirable feature in certain
technologies, -3 as we have learned from studies of the human body and
the Apollo space program. Finally, the implementation of an inflexible
technology requires a considerable investment in planning prior to
the actual operation of the system. For BART, then, preoperational
planning constitutes a form of action.
These differences between buses and trains imply that the politics
of incrementalism are different than the politics of prescription. A
bus system, by making no assumptions about future regional develop-
ment, is able to follow a physically decentralized, socially heteroge-
22. A bus facility epitomizes Simon's notion of a "nearly decomposable" system,
i.e., although the system itself is characterized by a high degree of complexity, if
one part of the system fails, the effects would hardly be noticeable in terms of the
system's ability to operate. The issue is not interdependence per se, but rather
what the consequences are for the interdependent system should the component
parts fail. See H. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 84-118 (1969).
23. See generally Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Dupli-
cation and Overlap, 29 Pu. AD. Rxv., July-Aug. 1969, at 346.
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neous pattern of development. In fact, it may increase the likelihood
of such development. Buses follow development rather than force it;
hence, decisions about future growth remain relatively open and
mutable. Finally, because of the inherent capability for adaptation
and adjustment in a flexible technology, a bus system, by responding
to feedback, may serve as a mechanism for reducing social conflict.
Implicit in the choice of a rail system, on the other hand, is a judg-
ment about what constitutes a desirable future in terms of land use
and development. Because a rail technology tends to force rather than
to follow development, the implementation of a rail system is, in effect,
an attempt to bring about a pre-vision of the future by deterring other
possibilities. Since growth is intended to occur at certain preselected
nudeated centers, the developmental objective, if realized, would tend
toward centralization and social homogeneity. Once the rails and
stations are set along a particular route, the extent to which BART,
as a technological system, can respond to the transportation require-
ments of a different future is extremely limited. To the extent that
the future is different, an inflexible technology may serve as a mecha-
nism for generating social conflict.
To recapitulate, the choice of technology can be understood as a
response to uncertainty. Decision-makers operating under conditions
of social complexity may use technology as a means of either shaping
the future or allowing the future to evolve. A bus system does not
rely on a specific pattern of development for its success, but rather
on a technology capable of adapting to developments. Because of its
inherent flexibility, a bus system seems better able to cope with a
future that cannot be known. On the other hand, BART is per-
ceived to be a system of the future even though it is an inflexible tech-
nology that cannot be adjusted to a future different from the one
envisioned by those who planned it. The irony is that a bus tech-
nology is strictly a system of the present while BART, in a curious
sort of way, may be a system of the future on its way to becoming a
system anchored in the past.
VI. SOCIAL COMPLEXITY, CONFLICT AND TECHNOLOGY
Increasing social complexity suggests that an organization's ex-
ternal social and institutional environment becomes increasingly
problematic.24 If survival can be posited as a minimum objective for
24. See generally 3. THomPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION (1967).
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an organization, this implies a degree of adaptation and responsiveness
to the social milieu of which the organization is a part. Furthermore,
it seems reasonable to assume that the greater the social complexity,
the greater the potential for social conflict. Since organizational
leaders probably prefer not to generate conflict, it is possible to con-
sider the implications of technological choice for creating or reducing
social conflict.3
The relationship between technological choice and social conflict
can be understood as a function of expectations versus outcomes,
costs, types of facilities, scales of construction, and lengths of installa-
tion periods. In general, the greater the potential of a proposed proj-
ect for disrupting existing community life, the greater the expected
resistance to, and conflict associated with, the implementation of the
project.
Bus systems are based upon a well-understood and conventional
technology. Because buses are neither new nor exciting, people know
basically what to expect from them. Even the well-managed bus sys-
tems receive little publicity. A decision to opt for bus transit involves
a relatively low capital investment cost. Furthermore, since buses
usually operate on nonexclusive facilities (public roadways), virtually
no construction activity is required. Therefore, the time-lag between
the decision to implement and the actual operation is relatively short.
Along with these inherent advantages, bus systems accrue an addi-
tional benefit due to their capacity for adaptation. Since bus drivers
are in continuous interaction with the organization's service environ-
ment, management is in a position to receive almost instantaneous
feedback. To the extent that the organization receives and responds
to feedback from those it serves, technology may be used as a means
of reducing social conflict.
On the basis of technologically innovative considerations alone, an
advanced rail system such as BART can be expected to engender more
social conflict than would a bus system. Hailed as a technological
breakthrough, BART generated great expectations of future benefits.
Promoted as the "solution" to problems of congestion and mobility
in the Bay Area, BART has attracted considerable national attention.
25. This is not to assert that technological choice, in and of itself, is responsible
for the presence or absence of conflict. Assuming a conflict exists, however, does a
particular technology tend to exacerbate or ameliorate the conflict?
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The greater the gap between expected and actual performance, the
greater the potential for conflict.
Rail technologies are also different from bus technologies in terms
of their requirements. The initial capital cost is high because trains
operate on single-purpose rather than multi-purpose facilities;
therefore, considerable construction activity is required. It follows
that there is a relatively longer time-lag involved in the implementa-
tion of a rail system. Finally, since a rail technology is inflexible, its
managers are limited in the extent to which they can respond to neg-
ative feedback. In short, we can expect train systems to engender
more social conflict than bus systems.
Unfortunately, the management of BART has experienced con-
siderable conflict with many elements in its external social and insti-
tutional environment, thereby confirming predictions in this regard.
Prior to the initiation of revenue service operations in September
1972, the organization had weathered a variety of storms. Among
them were conflicts with several Bay Area cities and counties over the
overall plan and proposed facilities, with California's legislature over
financing, with labor unions over employment practices, and with the
general public over various other issues.20
Criticism of BART has not abated since the beginning of passenger
service.27 For example, teenagers quickly discovered how to produce
their own transit "tickets," thereby duping the sophisticated equip-
ment produced by IBM. Despite the substandard quality of the tran-
sit cars provided by the Rohr Corporation, BART's managers, after
perfunctory complaints, awarded that firm an additional contract.
Safety and signalling equipment produced by Westinghouse has been
challenged as less adequate than that of conventional railroads, but
BART executives have resisted the pressure to change suppliers. A
labor strike that lasted for approximately one month shut down
transit operations entirely.
Although the outcome is more symbolic than substantive, BART's
managers were encouraged to end their formal association with the
26. Several of the earlier conflicts are elaborated in ZWERLINO, supra note 21,
at chs. 2-3.
27. A recent report prepared by California's legislative analyst questioned the
administrative and technical competence of BART's management, directors, engi-
neers and engineering consultants. See generally A. PosT INVESTIGATION OF THE
OPERATIONS OF THE BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT WITH PARTIaULAR
REFERENCE TO SAFETY AND CONTRAQT ADMINISTRATION (1972).
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engineering consulting firm of Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Tudor & Bech-
tel. In addition, by running afoul of the state legislature and the
Public Utilities Commission, the BART system is still not fully opera-
tional and will not be until at least September 1974, six years behind
schedule. Despite its restricted service schedule (weekdays only),
BART managers conceded early this year that the cost of providing
service is already higher than had been expected to operate trains
seven days and nights a week throughout the three-county system.
Moreover, they publicly announced that without state or federal aid,
BART faced the prospect of dosing down by early 1975. It appears
that conflict is endemic to BART.28
VII. SOME LESSONS FROMi BART
The BART experience is generally instructive about the relation-
ships among complexity, planning, technology and politics. In terms
of planning, it seems to me that the studies upon which the BART
system was based lacked both substance and penetration. Having
accepted their clients' definition and diagnosis of "the problem," the
consultants created a huge analytic apparatus to justify the conclusions
that their clients had already reached, i.e., that an interurban rail sys-
tem should be built. Admittedly, within the boundaries of the task as
defined, the consultants' work was creditable; yet unless one accepts
such a narrow perspective as exemplary of professional responsibility,
the boundaries were not valid. The major effects of the BART system
will be external; it will shape the future of the region. Yet there was
little analysis of these consequences. Instead, the BART proposal
was presented to citizens as a tool for relieving automobile conges-
tion while the principal instigators viewed BART as a tool for shap-
ing land-use development in the Bay Area for the economic gain of
downtown business interests.29
28. While the BART managers may be criticized for their inability to manage
conflict or to learn from it, there is a more important lesson to be extracted. It
seems quite likely that, if the public chooses a prescriptive technological solution,
those who are responsible for implementing that choice cannot afford to engage
in public debate about how that decision is to be executed. That is, it can be
argued that in order to implement the technology at all, the technological core
must be carefully buffered from all unnecessary uncertainties. While this may not
be an obvious consequence of selecting a prescriptive technology, its implications
should be understood by both public officials and voters.
29. In a presentation to the Bay Area Chapter of the American Society for
Public Administration on March 8, 1972, BART's Assistant General Manager, L.A.
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If this interpretation seems plausible, then technology can be under-
stood as an independent variable in political decision-making. The
significance of the distinction between adaptive and prescriptive tech-
nologies is that, while the technologies themselves are value-neutral,
the ends toward which they are directed are value-laden. As such, the
comparison between buses and trains is based not so much on their
relative effectiveness as transportation systems, but rather on their
relative capacities for shaping the future. Rapid transit planners may
have believed they were forecasting the future transportation require-
ments of the Bay Area for the next thirty years and then recommend-
ing the best way to meet them. In fact, they were legislating an image
of the future that they assumed to be desirable; a future with nucleated
centers and subcenters. These planners imagined themselves to be
predicting a Bay Area to be served by BART, but BART is likely to
create the very Bay Area they thought they were predicting. The
planners and promoters of BART, then, were in the business of en-
forcing a particular future as much as serving the future. By so doing
they preempted the public interest.
VIII. T-E TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM RECONSIDERED
For various reasons, Americans have failed to understand that the
primary issue is not so much how to solve problems, but rather how
to choose the fundamental problems we wish to solve.30 With respect
to public transit service, for example, we know how to supply trans-
portation facilities; the expertise and technical capability are available.
The difficulty is that we are not involved in the debate about what
should be done. Deciding what should be done is a political matter;
once this has been determined, the issue becomes how to accomplish
the specific objectives, and that is a technical matter. Yet the BART
experience constitutes an example of the contrary-political decision-
making in technological clothing.
Furthermore, with respect to providing transportation facilities, the
human dynamics of a large metropolitan area suggest that the problem
Kimball, stated that the primary purpose of rapid transit was indeed to shape the
future growth and development of the Bay Area. During a subsequent question-
and-answer period I asked Mr. Kimball whether this was the basis upon which
BART was presented to the public. He declined to respond to the question.
30. Drucker, What We Can Learn from Japanese Management, 48 HARV. Bus.
Rav., Mar.-Apr. 1971, at 110.
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of service is a continually changing one. In a very real sense, then,
the transportation "problem" is not really a problem at all; no
matter how much know-how we may acquire about providing transit
systems, we lack the know-what regarding future service requirements.
Consequently, the problem is not amenable to any final solution;
rather, the demand for service is an evolving problem to be dealt with
-democratically, if possible, given our political norms and heritage.
Implicit in this understanding is the notion that there is no single
definition of what constitutes good public transit service, although
most people probably have some idea of what might be better (or
worse) service than they are currently receiving.31 Not only does the
definition of good service differ from person to person, but these in-
dividual definitions themselves change over time.32 Viewed in this
perspective, a transportation system that cannot adapt itself to chang-
ing demands for service would seem singularly inappropriate.
Social planners bear a heavy burden of responsibility to ensure that
affected citizens are well informed about the broader social, political
and economic ramifications of plans put forth for public ratification.
The promoters of rapid transit in the Bay Area presented their pro-
posal in such a circumscribed manner as to suggest that there were no
such ramifications. While the voting public was persuaded that it was
being given the opportunity to improve public transportation in the
Bay Area, it was not also educated to the fact that, in addition, it was
being asked to approve a particular pattern of development for the
region. Narrow technical considerations appropriate to engineering
decisions are not a sufficient basis for the significant political decision
that BART really represented.
The development of technologies is a legitimate enterprise in our
culture. Technocracy-or rule by technology-is not legitimate since
it is inherently corrosive of the democratic process. BART is a prod-
uct not only of technology, but of technocracy. It is now clear that
BART's technocrats have implemented their political decision with
greater competence than their engineering designs. The question is,
31. Homburger, Fixed Facilities and Shifting Values, 4 HIGH SPEED GROUND
TF~usP. J., Jan. 1970, at 9.
32. Congestion and mobility, as twin facets of movement within metropolitan
areas, do not necessarily require investing in new types of technologies. See, e.g.,
Kain, How to Improve Urban Transportation at Practically No Cost, 20 PUB.
POLICY, Summer 1972, at 335.
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however, not whether the task of building BART was done in a tech-
nically competent manner; the point is that the prior task of deciding
to build BART was done in a politically irresponsible manner and the
subsequent implementation of that decision was removed from politi-
cal influence.
IX. TowARD THE FUTURE: TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICAL
DECISION-MAKING
Having described and analyzed the decision process that led to
BART, it would seem appropriate to conclude the essay at this point.
I feel obliged, however, to address the question of whether and in
what manner the process might have been different. What follows are
some thoughts-both negative and positive-regarding the role of tech-
nology and political decision-making in the future.
Two separate, but related, themes have been discussed. The sub-
stantive theme was whether, under conditions of increasing social
complexity, it makes sense to commit ourselves to technologies, such
as BART, that are neither adaptable nor adjustable to a changing
future. My belief is that it does not. Future possibilities and oppor-
tunities are simply beyond our comprehension. If we can agree that
decisions ought to be made with a view toward expanding the range
of diversity and choice available, it seems more sensible to make de-
cisions on the basis of negative criteria. That is, while we may not
be able to know precisely what our substantive preferences for the
future are, we should be careful to assure ourselves the opportunity
of making such choices. This suggests that irreversible choices are
to be avoided.
The procedural theme ignored the substantive merits of a techno-
logical system such as BART and emphasized instead the process by
which decisions were made. Democratic decision-making cannot be
evaluated in terms of the wisdom of substantive choices. Rather, it is
to be assessed in terms of the extent to which the process of choosing is
open and public (rather than closed and private) and the extent to
which the knowledge serving as the basis of choice is complete and
fully disclosed.
Despite a tendency to blend the substantive with the procedural
issue, the two are distinct. The substantive argument is that the ex-
perts have done well by persuading the public to accept large tech-
nological projects "in time" to avoid future problems. Even at the
expense of political deception, the outcome is salutary. In view of the
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recent fuel shortages, this argument is appealing, for despite cost
overruns, project delays and system malfunctions, the public will
benefit from BART. Perhaps this is so, but those agreeing with this
perspective must also acknowledge that-in this case, at least-the end
justified the means.
In my opinion, it matters not whether BART is the "right" de-
cision; what matters is the process by which the decision was made.
My preference for a flexible technology notwithstanding, I could not
quarrel with a decision process that adhered to the aforementioned,
admittedly idealistic, stipulations. My bias, then, is a procedural one.
If democratic values are worth preserving-as I think they are-what
is required to safeguard political liberty is a process of technology
assessment in the public interest. A functional equivalent of the
environmental impact statements required by the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 196933 would suffice. The public should
receive similar protection-a socio-political impact analysis-with re-
spect to any proposal for investing in large-scale, complex technologies.
The purpose of a socio-political impact statement would be to ex-
plore and report the probable consequences of the proposed invest-
ment. It would help voters to understand the social and political val-
ues that would be served by the proposed investment, and those that
would not be served. It would not be a statement for or against any
particular technology. Instead it would be a report to the public
about important indirect consequences of proposed investments in a
technology.
The proposed socio-political impact analysis is neither a panacea
nor a surrogate for involved citizen participation in public affairs.84
As the BART experience has shown, however, technology can be used
to legislate the future without full public consideration and/or dis-
closure of the consequences of that "legislative'" act. If we regard
this as undesirable, and if we wish to guard against this eventuality,
33. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
34. A recent article suggests that simply requiring an assessment of consequences
is not enough, at least not where the Federal Highway Administration is concerned.
In an effort to learn more about the implementation of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, 76 final-draft impact statements required for proposed urban
highway projects were analyzed. Sullivan & Montgomery, Surveying Highway
Impact, 14 ENVIRONMENT, Nov. 1972, at 12. The carefully documented findings
are not encouraging: "The impact statements surveyed contain arguments rather
than findings, opinions rather than studies, and generalities rather than facts."
Id. at 15.
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careful analysis and public review of probable effects of proposed
actions are essential. Although we presently lack adequate processes
for exploring the policy implications of technology and technological
change, the concept of socio-political impact studies, prepared in the
public interest, may be a step in the right direction.
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